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PUBLIC POLICY AND GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL
INTEGRATION: AN INTRODUCTION
FREDERICK M. ABBoTr*
Technological innovation and intellectual property are playing an
increasingly important role in the international economy.' The most
compelling evidence of this phenomenon is the evidence of our own
senses. Our office environments appear increasingly like photos of
NASA mission control on launch day. Average homes are moving
beyond cable access and into direct satellite link-up to media net-
works. Visitors to Shanghai are struck not by slogans urging commit-
ment to the revolution, but by slogans urging commitment to Hitachi,
Volkswagen, and Nike. Microsoft teamed Windows with the Rolling
Stones for what may be the single most visible and successful product
introduction in global history-a product introduction starting at the
international dateline and spreading across the planet in an hour-by-
hour progression.
The premise of the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations concern-
ing trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights ("TRIPS") was
that technology-based and intellectual property rights ("IPRs") de-
pendent businesses in the industrialized countries were suffering at
the hands of IPRs "pirates" in the developing countries. Data was
amassed by the affected industries to prove this case. This data lead
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") government policy-makers to the conclusion that IPRs-re-
lated losses were hurting the industrialized countries. They pursued
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. Keith E. Maskus, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, in COMMISSION OF THE Eu-
ROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EUROPEAN ECONOMY, No. 52, at 157 (1993), details the extent to which
trade in technology-based products and technology itself has increased as a component of inter-
national trade. The emergence of advanced technology as a key component of economic growth
in the industrialized countries is a major theme of both LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON, WHO's
BASHING WHOM? (1992) and LESTER THUROW, THE COMING CLASH (1992). Statistics assem-
bled by WIPO indicate far higher growth in the internationalization of patent applications than
in "first filings" for patents. See Francis Gurry, The Evolution of Technology and Markets and
the Management of Intellectual Property Rights, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 369, 371-72 (1996). The
annual White Paper of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry, JETRO,
WHITE PAPER ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE: JAPAN 1992, at 103 (1992) [hereinafter MITI WHITE
PAPER], notes that within Japanese international work sharing arrangements, the higher value-
added high technology component of manufacturing processes tends to take place in Japan,
while the lower value-added labor intensive components are performed in Southeast Asian
countries.
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the establishment of high standards of IPRs protection, and legiti-
mized the imposition of trade sanctions on countries which fail to up-
hold these standards. The Uruguay Round's IPRs protection effort
succeeded well beyond the initial expectations of industrialized coun-
try industry groups and governments. 2 The basis for this success was
an aggressive trade and IPRs policy pursued by the United States and,
to a lesser extent, the European Union, coupled with promises of con-
cessions to the developing countries in non-TRIPS Agreement Uru-
guay Round sectors such as agriculture. 3
The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ("TRIPS Agreement") that came into force on Janu-
ary 1, 1995, is not an isolated phenomenon with respect to IPRs pro-
tection. 4 The main arena for global IPRs administration is the World
Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"). WIPO-predecessor ac-
tivities in the international IPRs field date back to the late 1800s, dur-
ing which the first efforts at quasi-harmonized IPRs protection were
initiated. A modest system of global IPRs protection based largely on
2. Industry groups did not believe that it would be possible to negotiate a TRIPS Agree-
ment that would establish high standards of IPRs protection and be agreed to by developing
countries. Thus they initially proposed the negotiation of a limited TRIPS code (this was also the
initial proposal of the USTR). See Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the
Third World: Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 715-17 (1989) (regarding proposals).
3. Examples of aggressive U.S. IPRs-related actions during the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions are numerous. Regarding long-running IPRs-related disputes and trade threats vis-a-vis,
inter alia, Argentina, Brazil, and Thailand, see USTR Report Takes Aim at Japan in Outlining
Foreign Trade Barriers, 8 World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) 131 (May 1994); Senate Passes Copy-
right Bill; House Expected to Follow Suit, 8 World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) 324 (Nov. 1994)
(Thailand). It certainly occurred to some developing country commentators that in the final
analysis the developing countries gave more in the negotiations than they got. See Dr. Eduardo
Conesa, Remarks made to Panel on Implications of the Uruguay Round, ILA Biennial Confer-
ence (Aug. 1994) (author's notes).
The United States continues its aggressive stance toward countries that it regards as failing
to adequately protect IPRs. See, regarding the Peoples' Republic of China, for example, China,
U.S. Announce Eleventh Hour Agreement Averting Costly Trade War, 10 World Intell. Prop. Rep.
(BNA) 209 (July 1996); Statement by Acting U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky Con-
cerning Trade Talks with China on IP Rights, and Fact Sheet on Chinese Implementation of 1995
IPR Enforcement Agreement, 10 World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) 213 (July 1996) (released June
17, 1996); USTR, Determination of Action Concerning the People's Republic of China's Protec-
tion of Intellectual Property and Provision of Market Access to Persons Who Rely on Intellectual
Property Protection, USTR Docket No. 301-92, Feb. 4, 1995.
4. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33
I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. Regarding the TRIPS Agreement as con-
cluded, see Adrian Otten, Improving the Playing Field for Exports: The Agreements on Intellec-
tual Property, Investment Measures and Government Procurement, in GATT" URUGUAY ROUND
67 (Thomas Cottier ed., 1995); J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual
Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L LAW. 345
(1995).
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the national treatment principle was created at the end of the nine-
teenth century. Only in the past decade, though, has WIPO truly be-
gun to flower as an international IPRs clearinghouse, facilitating in
great measure the effective grant of global IPRs. These activities are
rooted in the Patent Cooperation Treaty ("PCT"), which provides a
mechanism for an international prior art report on a patent applica-
tion, coupled with a procedure for multiple national patent applica-
tions accompanied by that report.5 Though the international patent
system continues to be based on the grant of national patent rights,
the PCT system is part of a progressive evolution toward a truly global
patenting system. Copyright protection is secured on a global basis
through the mechanism of the Berne Convention,6 and considerable
progress has been made toward establishing a single application global
trademark registration system.7
Figures compiled by WIPO confirm a marked trend toward the
globalization of IP.s protection. Between 1985 and 1990, secondary
filings of patent applications (i.e., filings in a second or subsequent
patent office based on an initial filing) increased dramatically, while
initial patent applications remained practically constant. 8 Usage of
the PCT system is expanding at a dramatic rate.9 Not surprisingly, the
ownership of patents is concentrated in large multinational enterprises
that heavily invest in technology-related research and development. 10
5. Regarding the operation of the PCT system, see WIPO, The Patent Cooperation Treaty
(PCT) in 1992, Press Release PCT/64 (Jan. 29, 1993)[hereinafter the PCTin 1992 ]; WIPO, Basic
Patent Cooperation Treaty Practice, PCT/SEM1285 (Apr. 1996).
6. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, done July 14,
1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
7. New instruments with respect to trademarks include the Protocol Relating to the Ma-
drid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, done at Madrid, June 8,
1989, entered into force April 1, 1996, and the Trademark Law Treaty, done at Geneva, October
27, 1994, entered into force August 1, 1996. Also see the Hague Agreement Concerning the
International Deposit of Industrial Designs, for example, at Gurry, supra note 1, at 374; the draft
Protocol to the Berne Convention, at WIPO, Preparatory Work for a Possible Protocol and a
Possible New Instrument, WIPO/ACAD/E/93/26 (Sept. 1993); and the draft Patent Law Treaty
(which is facing some difficulties from the United States at the moment), at WtPO, New Treaties
in the Making: Their Origins, Scope and Implications: The Patent Law Treaty, WIPO/ACAD/E/
93/18 (Sept. 1993).
8. See Gurry, supra note 1, at 371-72.
9. In 1978, WIPO received 459 international applications under the new PCT. See The
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) in 1992, supra note 5, at 11 13-14. In 1992, WIPO received
25,917 international applications. See id. In 1992, the average number of states designated per
international application was 25.5. See id. In 1995, WIPO received 38,906 international applica-
tions under the PCT. See Gurry, supra note 1, at 373.
10. See Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, The Economic Justification for the Grant of
Intellectual Property Rights: Patterns of Convergence and Conflict 72 Cm.-KEr L. REv. 439,
(1996); Teresa Riordan, Which Companies Had the Most Patents in 1994? It Depends on Which
Set of Statistics You Believe, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 3, 1995, at D2; Carl S. Kaplan, Is U.S. Falling
Behind, Or Is World Catching Up?, NEWSDAY, July 23, 1989, at 47.
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A single multinational enterprise may maintain thousands of trade-
mark registrations throughout the world.
Over the past five years, the relationship between liberal interna-
tional trade rules and competition law has become the subject of in-
creasing attention from governments, the business community, and
scholars. 1 The genesis of this attention is a perception that certain
major industrialized markets are protected against import penetration
by the failure of national governments to police against competitive
market restraints. 12 The reduction or elimination of formal trade bar-
riers, it is argued, does not achieve the desired result of stimulating
international competition, with corollary comparative advantage ef-
fects, if markets are allocated, formally or informally, among domestic
producers. In this context, competition law is viewed largely as an
exporter's market access tool.
Significantly less attention has been paid to the extent to which
industrial and service industry concentration maybe increasing at the
international level, and the role that competition law might play in
addressing a pattern of concentration.13 Without doubt, global mar-
kets are becoming increasingly integrated through international work-
sharing arrangements, and this integration is taking place within large-
scale multinational corporate structures. 14
11. See, e.g., OECD Roundtable on the New Dimensions of Market Access in a Globalizing
Economy (June 30-July 1, 1994) (papers to be published). This conference was attended by
OECD government representatives, business community representatives, and members of the
academic community, and focused on market access issues, particularly relating to investment
laws and competition laws. The International Trade Law Committee of the International Law
Association ("ILA") is presently engaged in a research project concerning the relationship be-
tween WTO trade rules and competition rules. See Second Report of the International Trade
Law Committee of the ILA, Helsinki Biennial Conference (Aug. 1996) (E.-U. Petersmann &
F.M. Abbott, Rapporteurs); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for Gov-
ernments and for Private Business: A "Trade Law Approach" for Linking Trade and Competition
Rules in the WTO, 72 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 545 (1996). The addition of a working group on trade
and competition is being debated as a possible part of the WTO December 1996 Singapore
Ministerial conference agenda.
12. Japan is cited as the market failure prototype. This is, of course, a complicated story.
See, e.g., LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON, WHO's BASHING WHOM? (1992); MITSUO MATSUSHITA,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMPETITION LAw IN JAPAN (1993). In 1996, the United States
had initiated a dispute settlement proceeding in the WTO alleging that anticompetitive restraints
and related market access barriers are impeding the access of U.S. photographic products suppli-
ers to the Japanese market. See U.S. to Seek Resolution in WTO of Japan Film Market Com-
plaint, 13 Int'l Tr. Rep. (BNA) 1001 (June 19, 1996).
13. The European Union and its competition rules are an exception to this general lack of
attention, but the EU itself is an exception based on its highly evolved plan of regional market
integration.
14. Perhaps the most illuminating discussion of this phenomenon can be found in the an-
nual White Paper of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry. See, e.g., MITI
WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 119-46.
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Still less attention has been paid to the role of industrial or intel-
lectual property in industrial integration and concentration. The most
comprehensive study of the role of intellectual property in industrial
concentration was produced by Walton Hamilton in 1941.15 Recent
studies of the role of intellectual property in the international eco-
nomic system have largely been generated by industry sources to sup-
port the GATT Uruguay Round TRIPS Agreement. 16 There are a
few significant recent scholarly studies of the role of intellectual prop-
erty rights in the international trading system. These studies clearly
acknowledge the existence of critical information gaps, and the lack of
empirical foundation for claims frequently made by industry concern-
ing the benefits of high levels of IPRs protection. 17
Business reports regarding consolidation in IPRs-dependent in-
dustries from the last year alone should have aroused the public policy
antennae of the most jaded government officials. The U.S. media/en-
tertainment industry is consolidating within a few large corporate con-
glomerate structures.' 8 There may be hundreds of television channels
15. SENATE TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMM., 76TH CONG., 3D SESS., INVESTIGA-
TION OF CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER: PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE 164 (Comm.
Print 1941) (W. Hamilton, Monograph No. 31); see also SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS
AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC RE-
VIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM (Comm. Print 1958) (Fritz Machlup).
16. See, e.g., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT?
(R.M. Gadbaw & T. Richards eds., 1988); R.M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1990).
17. See, for example, Maskus, supra, note 1, at 172, stating:
In truth, there is little systematic evidence that natural market mechanisms for appro-
priating returns on innovation have been eroded and that stronger patents would cor-
rect the situation. This is an unfortunate gap in our understanding of the situation and
leaves unresolved the important empirical question of whether greater protection of
IPRs would call forth substantially more inventive activity. This question lies at the
heart of the debate over international protection of IPRs.
And see Carlos A. Primo Braga, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Issues: The Uruguay Round
Agreement and its Economic Implications, presented at The Uruguay Round and the Developing
Economies, World Bank Conf. (Jan. 26-27, 1995), stating, for example:
This brief review underscores the limitations of normative recommendations concern-
ing changes in the rules for IPRs at the world level. For the South, the strengthening of
IPRs protection will have different characteristics depending on the characteristics of
each country. Generalizations can only be made if strong assumptions are adopted.
Id. at 38. Note, however, that Primo Braga sees mounting evidence that implementation of the
TRIPS Agreement will have a net trade-creating effect, though observing that no precise welfare
predictions can be drawn from this tentative conclusion. See id. at 42.
See also Edson Kenji Kondo, Patent Laws and Foreign Direct Investment: An Empirical
Investigation, UMI Dissertation Services (May 1994); U.N. Transnat'l Corps. & Management
Div., Dep't of Econs. & Soc. Dev., Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment,
ST/CTC/SER.A/24 (1993) (both finding lack of empirical evidence of positive correlation be-
tween high levels of foreign direct investment and high levels of IPRs protection by host
countries).
18. The Walt Disney Company paid $18 billion to absorb ABC/Capitol Cities; Time
Warner, owner of Warner Brothers Studios and major cable distribution outlets, has offered $8
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in the new information age, but it appears that, in the United States at
least, most of them may be owned by a half-dozen companies. The
cost of entry into the global media industry has reached into the bil-
lions of dollars, and there is little doubt that the media giants will be
wielding tremendous influence.
Microsoft is acknowledged as the universal provider of personal
computer operating systems.19 While independent video-game devel-
opers may (or may not) thrive, the industry that produces personal
computer business application programs has undergone a swift and
dramatic consolidation.20  Intel dominates the market for
microprocessors, one of the most costly components of the personal
computer system.21 The high definition flat-panel color displays used
in almost all notebook computers are manufactured by a few large
Japanese firms.22
The telecommunications industry is undergoing a process of
global integration. This process has been stimulated by the privatiza-
tion of many important national telecommunications markets. The
three U.S. long distance giants, AT&T, MCI and Sprint, have been
teaming with national carriers throughout the world in an effort to
billion for Turner Broadcasting; Viacom International acquired Paramount Pictures and Block-
buster Entertainment; General Electric acquired NBC; Westinghouse Electric acquired CBS for
more than $5 billion; News Corp. owns 20th Century Fox and the Fox Network; Seagram's ac-
quired MCA for about $6 billion. See, e.g., Sallie Hofmeiste et al., It's Back to the Future for
Disney; Deal Shows Those Old Stalwarts-The TV Networks-Have Gained New Life and Re-
spect. Now They Are Seen as Keys to the Global Entertainment Age, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1995, at
Al; Diane Mermigas, Big Bidders Wait in Wings for MGM/UA, ELECrRONIC MEDIA, Mar. 18,
1996, at 2.
19. See, e.g., Matthew May, Can Anyone Stop Microsoft? T-E TIMES (LONDON), Mar. 17,
1995. IBM has attempted to maintain a viable competitive product in OS/2, but its market share
is far below that of Microsoft's Windows. See Cate T. Corcoran, True Blue No More-Guarded
View of Big Blue, INFOWORLD, Feb. 5, 1996, at 1.
20. IBM has absorbed Lotus; Corel has absorbed WordPerfect; Microsoft now offers a
range of leading PC applications with more extensive coverage than IBM and Corel. These
three companies, along with a few others such as Borland, dominate the word processing and
spreadsheet markets, and control much of the relational database market. See, e.g., Kristen
Moulton, Novell To Sell WordPerfect and Related Software to Corel, Associated Press Newswire,
Jan. 31, 1996. Microsoft refrained from attempting to absorb Quicken (the leading home finan-
cial management program) after objection by the U.S. Justice Department. See, e.g., 0. Casey
Corr, Microsoft Drops $2 Billion Deal to Buy Intuit, SEATIrLE TIMES, May 21, 1995, at Al.
21. Intel faces some price competition from producers of Intel-microprocessor clones, such
as Advanced Micro Devices. Apple Computer, holding less than a ten percent share of the PC
market uses an alternative processor. On the whole, however, Intel dominates the global market
for PC microprocessors. See, e.g., Thomas W. Haines, Intel: A Chip Above, SEAI-rLE TIMES,
June 30, 1996, at Fl; John Foley, Desktop Systems-Wintel Under Seige, INFO. WEEK, Mar. 11,
1996, at 36.
22. Japanese manufacturers may face increasing competition from Korean competitors.
See, e.g., Nick Turner, Will New Screens Give U.S. An Opening In Flat Panels?, INVESTOR'S Bus.
DAILY, Feb. 13, 1996. at A8.
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build consolidated global telecommunications networks. 23 It is not
unrealistic to imagine a global telecommunications market divided
among three large consortia, with perhaps a fourth major market
player in the form of a global cellular consortium relying on a satel-
lite-based system.24
Other examples of consolidation in technology-based industries
readily enough spring to mind. Consider for example the biotechnol-
ogy industry and the pharmaceutical industry.25 The banking sector in
the United States, which has become highly dependent on computer
networking technologies, has been the subject of increasing
consolidation. 26
While there appears to be a pattern of concentration in a number
of technology-based industries, the foregoing references are anecdo-
tal. At least until recently, we could point to a pattern of intense com-
petition in the computer industry which had stimulated innovation
and cost-cutting. Until recently, much of the international telecom-
munications industry was controlled by government-owned or
chartered monopolies. The present situation in telecommunications
is, from a competitive standpoint, preferable to that which existed a
decade ago. In fact, with respect to each industry just mentioned, an
argument might be made that the apparent pattern of concentration is
only a response to changing global patterns of competition or to the
realities of large-scale research and development.
With the situation in Europe as an exception,2 7 almost all regula-
tion of potential market failures in technology-based sectors and pro-
23. See, e.g., Barbara Grady, Global Data Traffic Spurs Sprint, Europeans, Reuter Bus. Rep.
(June 8, 1994).
24. Regarding Motorola's progress in creating a global cellular network with an initial con-
sortium investment of $3.4 billion, see Edmund L. Andrews, Motorola Unit Has Funds for Sky-
Phone System, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1994, at D3; William Boston, Vebacom, Stet in Iridium
Satellite Phone Cooperation, Reuter Eur. Comm. Rep. (Mar. 26, 1996).
25. The wave of biotechnology start-ups and initial public offerings was followed by a wave
of acquisitions by established pharmaceutical firms. See, e.g., Ronald Rosenberg, Will Biogen,
Genzyme Be Next Takeover Targets, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 13, 1995, at 52; Susan Moffat, Biotech
Pioneer Cetus, Neighbor Firm to Merge, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 1991, at D1. The global pharma-
ceutical industry has recently witnessed a pattern of large-scale mergers and acquisitions. See,
e.g., Edward Wyatt, After the Upjohn Deal, Takeover Talk Turns to Warner-Lambert, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 22, 1995, at D8.26. For example, in the past several years Chemical acquired Chase; Wells Fargo acquired
First Interstate, having previously acquired Crocker; and Bank of America acquired Security
Pacific. See Thomas S. Mulligan, Wells Fargo Makes $10.9 Billion Bid for First Interstate, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 1995, at Al.
27. The European Commission investigates and takes action against IPRs-related competi-
tion abuses, and there are a number of decisions of the European Court of Justice regarding
IPRs-related abusive practices. See, for example, Case T-70/89, British Broadcasting Corp. v.
EC Comm'n, 4 C.M.L.R. 669 (Ct. of First Instance 1991), and cases cited therein. See also Case
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tection against IPRs-based market abuses takes place at the national
level. The WTO TRIPS Agreement does not contemplate an interna-
tional mechanism for regulating against IPRs-based market failures,
though the 1948 Havana Charter for the International Trade Organi-
zation ("ITO") did contemplate such an arrangement. Article 46 of
the Havana Charter contained an undertaking by Members to prevent
restraints on competition (and to cooperate with the Organization in
preventing such restraints) and permitted a Member to bring a com-
plaint to the Organization on the basis that another Member failed to
deal with a competition-related situation. Included among the specific
kinds of practices which the Organization's dispute settlement proce-
dure would address was commercial conduct:
3(e) preventing by agreement the development or application of
technology or invention whether patented or unpatented;
(f) extending the use of rights under patents, trade marks or copy-
rights granted by any Member to matters which, according to its
laws and regulations, are not within the scope of such grants., or to
products or conditions of production, use or sale which are likewise
not the subjects of such grants. 28
The ITO would have had the authority to "request each Member con-
cerned to take every possible remedial action, and ... recommend to
the Members concerned remedial measures to be carried out in ac-
cordance with their respective laws and procedures. ' 29 The Organiza-
tion would have prepared, distributed to Members, and made public a
report on its decisions and the remedial actions taken by Members. 30
The WTO TRIPS Agreement permits Members to take action
against competition-related IPRs abuses,31 politely encourages the
sharing of information when a Member seeks to enforce its own com-
petition laws with respect to activities occurring in another Member's
jurisdiction, 32 and permits the granting by Members of compulsory
licenses to remedy anticompetitive abuses of IPRs.33 The TRIPS
262/81, Coditel SA v. Cine-Vog Films SA 1982 E.C.R. 3381, 1 C.M.L.R. 49 (1983) (reference for
a preliminary ruling from the Cour de Cassation of the Kingdom of Belgium). The situation in
the European Union is unique because of the general design of the Union system and its vision
of a fully integrated single market.
28. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, United States Conference on
Trade and Employment (Nov. 21, 1947 - Mar. 24, 1948) (Final Act and Related Documents,
Restrictive Business Practices, ch. V, art. 46 (March 1948)).
29. Id. arts. 8, 48(7).
30. See id. art. 48(9)-(10).
31. See TRIPS Agreement art. 40:1-2. An illustrative list of practices refers to "exclusive
grantback conditions, conditions preventing challenges to validity and coercive package licens-
ing." Id. art. 40:3.
32. See id. art. 40:3.
33. See id. art. 31(k)-(]).
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Agreement, unlike the relevant provisions of the Havana Charter,
does not impose an obligation on Members to control restrictive prac-
tices, and so does not provide an overt institutional mechanism for
dealing with Members that fail to control such practices.
Not all IPRs protect industrial innovation: Patents protect inven-
tions. Copyright protects a wide range of subject matter, from books
and movies to computer software. Trademarks identify the origin of
goods, and arguably protect corporate goodwill. Historically, a dis-
tinction has been made between "industrial property" and other "in-
tellectual property." The former (typically the patent and trademark)
related to industrial application, while the latter (typically copyright
and neighboring rights) usually related to artistic creativity. There
has, however, been a blurring of lines; for example, consider the ex-
tension of copyright protection to computer software. The old termi-
nology therefore, is not particularly useful. However, it is important
to note that different forms of intellectual property serve different
functions, and that in a process of public welfare analysis not all IPRs
issues may be treated as equivalents. 34
The key points are these: First, at the heart of the trend toward
global technological integration is the global system for the protection
of IPRs. Industry is aware of this.35 Without copyright protection,
media market power immediately dissipates. Without patent protec-
tion, pharmaceuticals are readily copied. Without trademark protec-
tion, the market for running shoes opens widely.
Second, IPRs are government-granted rights, and governments
are acting in the public interest. There is no divine mandate that a
patent must last for twenty years, and that a patent should secure a
global monopoly with only the most minimal payment from the patent
holder.
Third, the effect globalizing IPRs has on the public has never been
studied in anything close to a comprehensive way, nor have alterna-
34. The function of the different forms of IPRs is discussed in Frederick M. Abbott (Co-
Rapporteur), First Report to the Committee on International Trade Law of the International Law
Association on the Subject of Parallel Importation, presented at ILA Helsinki Biennial Conf.
(Aug. 1996).
35. As clearly evidenced by the aggressive posture taken by groups such as the Interna-
tional Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) and Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
Association (PhRMA) in seeking U.S. government support for worldwide IPRs protection. See,
e.g., China, Russia, Turkey Head List of JIPA's Special 301 Targets, 10 World Intell. Prop. Rep.
(BNA) 107 (Apr. 1996); IIPA, PhRMA Cite Several Countries for USTR "Special 301" Action, 9
World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) 80 (Mar. 1995).
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tives to the present international IPRs protection system been seri-
ously considered.
Fourth, there is a clear intersection between IPRs protection and
competition law. Competition law is designed to protect the public
interest and might be used to police the international IPRs protection
system. This would be in accordance with classical thinking on main-
taining the integrity of markets. The United States has recently ar-
ticulated its approach to the interrelationship between IPRs
protection and competition law in its revised Antitrust Guidelines for
the Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995) and its Antitrust En-
forcement Guidelines for International Operations (1995).36
It would be unfortunate, however, if consideration of the effect of
the international IPRs system on the public were limited to the poten-
tial utility of competition law. More innovative approaches might be
worthwhile to consider. What if the holder of a global patent were
required to pay a maintenance fee on its stream of income to WIPO,
which might maintain a multibillion dollar fund to encourage techno-
logical development or to finance engineering education for develop-
ing country youth? What if pharmaceutical companies paid a share of
their global patent-based income into a fund for the maintenance of
public health facilities wherever they might be needed? What if the
income to the author of a copyrighted work were limited to a fixed
amount, beyond which copyrighted works entered the public domain?
Frightening thoughts perhaps, but only if we accept at face value the
present system of IPRs protection inherited from our grandparents,
who had no idea whatsoever what the twenty-first century might look
like. It may be worthwhile to recall that business enterprises pay fees
or taxes on many kinds of licenses from governments.
The fact of the matter is that we do not understand the interna-
tional intellectual property system's potential impact on the public in-
terest. The lack of attention to this area is itself an interesting topic
for study. A comprehensive study of the international intellectual
property system and its impact on public welfare would be an expen-
sive and time consuming project. Data collection and analytical meth-
ods present rather unique difficulties arising out of the intangible
character of the subject matter. The subject matter itself is somewhat
esoteric, and may not captivate public attention. There is little in the
way of a non-governmental organization constituency that concerns
itself with IPRs and the public interest. On the other hand, there is a
36. See 34 I.L.M. 1115, 34 I.L.M. 1080. respectively.
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great deal of corporate attention to achieving and maintaining high
levels of IPRs protection.
One of the most difficult problems facing policy-makers is the
speed at which transformation of the global economy is occurring.
There is no human intelligence sufficiently comprehensive to map the
potential impact of this change. In a very real sense, the pace of tech-
nological development and introduction into human society has out-
stripped the capacity of the human race to control it. There is
evidence of this phenomenon in many fields of activity.
Scientists can now manipulate human genetic structures, yet we
have no basic agreement as to how this capability should be managed,
or as to what its impact may be. Industry has already created much of
an information superhighway connecting human beings around the
world. The impact this will have on governmental authority and polit-
ical systems is rather uncertain. New manufacturing technologies are
permitting the replacement of human labor on a mass scale, yet there
is very little in the way of public planning for the consequences.
We cannot and should not put genies back into bottles. But we
must devote more of our attention to the public policy implications of
global technological development and integration. This Symposium is
quite deliberately not about a single event or phenomenon. We have
tried to assemble a group of distinguished public policy specialists to
reflect on our changing world, and to help us prepare in 1997 for the
year 2010.
The general theme of this Symposium raises a broad spectrum of
issues. Without intending to prejudice the choice of subject matter
that our speakers would address, we raised a few specific questions to
help focus collective attention:
1. Does the globalization of markets make existing concepts of mar-
ket power obsolete? Are there always potential competitors with
access to adequate entry capital present? Can we adequately define
"global market power"? Note a mainstream view that liberal trade
rules virtually assure high levels of competition and competitive
pricing, which is evidenced at least in the U.S. context by a low level
of price inflation.
2. The U.S. Department of Justice Licensing Guidelines start with
the premise that ownership of IPRs is not by itself evidence of mar-
ket power. It is only in the acts of IPRs holders that market abuse
may be found. Is this a useful and valid starting point to evaluate
the competitive impact of IPRs ownership?
3. What public interest justifies the grant of IPRs monopolies on an
international basis?
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A. What happens to the rate of return of the investor
in a patented product when the invention is marketed
globally, as opposed to nationally? Is the increased rate of
return (if any) justifiable on a public interest basis? Is the
"public interest" an interest of each individual nation, or is
there a "global public interest"?
B. Do patents stimulate invention, or merely provide
monopoly rents to inventors? Does disclosure of the best
available means to practice the invention benefit subse-
quent inventors and producers sufficiently to justify the
monopoly rents? Do inventors in developing countries
benefit from disclosure by OECD-based enterprises? If
not, why should consumers in developing countries pay
monopoly rents? Would trade secret protection adequately
serve the purposes of inventors and producers in all
countries?
C. Should artists (protected by copyright) and inven-
tors (protected by patent) be evaluated differently from a
public interest/competition law standpoint? What if the
artist is Walt Disney or Microsoft?
4. Are OECD country-based enterprises and consumers assured of
benefitting from high levels of IPRs protection at the expense of
non-OECD enterprises and consumers? If so, should OECD gov-
ernments assume that the situation is in the best interests of OECD
residents and refrain from pursuing alternatives?
5. How would a comprehensive mapping of the global IPRs system
and its impact be designed? What organization might best be re-
sponsible for undertaking such a study? Are gaps in the tools of
quantitative analysis too great to permit quantitative results to be
meaningful? If so, what other types of analysis might be useful?
See, for example, the study of the patent system, J. Jewkes, D. Saw-
ers and S. Stillerman, The Sources of Invention (1958), addressing
whether patents stimulate invention. Interviews of leading inven-
tors were the principal source of data, and provided a much more
interesting and complex picture than might have been obtained
through strictly quantitative methods.
6. Are IPRs/competition issues and telecommunications market in-
tegration issues analytically distinct? Does the fact that both arise
from the same phenomenon; i.e., the integration of global markets
based on technological development, suggest the desirability of pur-
suing similar analytic approaches?
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